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Algorithmic Warfare and the Reinvention of Accuracy 
This article aims to integrate two interrelated strands in critical security studies. 
The first is mounting evidence for the fallacy of claims for precision and 
accuracy in the United States ‘counterterrorism’ program, particularly as it 
involves expanding aerial surveillance in support of operations of extrajudicial 
assassination. The second line of critical analysis concerns growing investment in 
the further automation of these operations, more specifically in the form of the 
US Department of Defense Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, or 
Project Maven. Building upon generative intersections of critical security studies 
and science and technology studies (STS), I argue that the promotion of 
automated data analysis under the sign of artificial intelligence can only serve to 
exacerbate military operations that are at once discriminatory and indiscriminate 
in their targeting, while remaining politically and legally unaccountable. 
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In April of 2017, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) announced a proposal 
for the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, code-named Project Maven 
(Deputy Secretary of Defense 2017). The announcement by then Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert Work asserted the urgent need to incorporate ‘artificial intelligence and 
machine learning across [DoD] operations,’ citing ‘increasingly capable adversaries and 
competitors.’ The urgency expressed in Work’s call contributes to a wider, highly 
performative rhetoric announcing an inescapable artificial intelligence (AI) arms race, 
in which Russia and China are figured as the primary antagonists. Project Maven’s aim, 
Work states in his memorandum, is ‘to turn the enormous volume of data available to 
DoD in the form of full-motion video into actionable intelligence and insights at speed.’ 
The plan as Work sets it out includes an initial project focused on the task of labeling 
data within full-motion video generated by US Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
surveillance operations, as a first step toward establishing the algorithms and 
computational infrastructures needed to automate ‘object detection, classification, and 
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alerts’ in support of weapons targeting. 
In the spirit of this special issue (see Bellanova et al forthcoming), my analysis 
of these developments works at the intersections of scholarship in critical security 
studies and in science and technology studies (STS), particularly as each is increasingly 
informed by feminist theory and research. More specifically, I read security studies 
scholarship on the militarisation of perception as, inter alia, a project of explicating how 
violent force figures a threat and finds its targets. Research in STS, commensurately, 
has been devoted to tracking developments in military technologies with the 
understanding that technologies incorporate not only objects but also subject positions, 
bodies, discourses, and material practices. A feminist sensibility, in turn, directs 
attention to how difference is enacted as an integral constituent of technologies of 
militarism, and with what consequences for the differential valuation of lives.i 
My approach to the question of how US militarism determines a threat begins 
with military discourses of ‘situational awareness.’ As a scalable construct, situational 
awareness can range in its reference from the moment-to-moment comprehension by a 
combatant of their immediate circumstances, to comprehensive geopolitical 
understanding as a basis for strategic military planning and operations. Crucially for my 
purposes here, situational awareness is considered by military analysts to be the pre-
requisite for action adherent to the laws of war. This applies most pointedly to the act of 
killing, including the critical process of identifying who or what comprises a legitimate 
target. 
Despite military aspirations to perfect situational awareness, the latter continues 
to be subverted by the problem named within military doctrine as the ‘fog of war’ 
(Owens 2000; Davidson 2011). Project Maven can be read, in this context, as a recent 
instance of the recurring promise of a technological solution to that enduring problem. 
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In the contemporary moment, fantasies of dissolving the fog of war and achieving 
perfect accuracy in threat identification are invested in expanding data infrastructures, 
which in turn compel further developments in the automation of data analysis. Accuracy 
of targeting has become a touchstone for claims to military legitimacy but also, I will 
argue, a construct that increasingly obscures more than it reveals. 
My critique works from the premise that claims for accuracy, which justify new 
investments in automated targeting systems, are based on a systematic conflation of the 
relation between a weapon and its designated target on one hand, and the identification 
of what constitutes a (legitimate) target on the other. No amount of improvement in the 
precision of the first can address the growing uncertainties and obfuscations of the 
second. Insisting that they can is part of a campaign to deny the culpability of the US 
military in increasing reliance on ever more questionable forms of stereotypic 
categorisation of who constitutes a legitimate target, and the expanding temporal and 
spatial boundaries of what comprises an imminent threat. In the context of so-called 
counterterrorism operations, the sign of the uniformed combatant has been displaced by 
practices of identification largely reliant on racial/ethnic and behavioural profiling. The 
imminent threat, moreover, no longer requires any actual evidence that an attack on a 
specific person or interest of the US will take place, or is even planned. Simple 
association of an individual by the surveillance apparatus with a category of targeted 
persons defined to be a threat is enough. At the same time, the strategic vagueness of 
the trope of precision with respect to the grounds for targeting is matched by an 
associated lack of clarity in what exactly comprises AI, a figure that floats free of the 
specific and still highly conditional techniques of data analysis that it glosses, and the 
inseparability of those data analytics from politics. Both underwrite new levels of 
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military technophilia while mystifying the questionable apparatuses of recognition on 
which these ‘intelligent’ systems rely, and which they further institutionalize. 
I begin with a review of writings within critical security studies and STS 
relevant to a critique of what I call, following Mackenzie (1990), the reinvention of 
accuracy in algorithmically enabled weapon systems. I then turn to a more extended 
discussion of the problem of situational awareness, and accompanying proposals for 
machine ‘recognition’ as a technological solution. On this analysis, situational 
awareness can be understood as an apparatus of recognition. The apparatus in Barad’s 
conception (2007, 171) is that which enacts a boundary or cut that delineates entities 
and articulates their differences. Considered within this frame, situational awareness is 
one among the many apparatuses through which the architecture of enmity is put in 
place and into practice within the imaginative and territorial geographies of American 
militarism.ii These ideas are then drawn through the case of UAS infrastructures, 
particularly those technologies of data analysis that are animated by, and enabling of, 
the current revival of the field of artificial intelligence. This provides the context for my 
discussion of Project Maven and its successor projects in the form of increasingly 
automated weapon systems. I conclude with a reflection on the implications of a critical 
challenge to algorithmic warfare, understood as the strategic reinvention of 
technologically-determined accuracy, and as an apparatus designed to normalise 
unaccountable acts of extrajudicial assassination. 
 
Reinventing accuracy 
A generative precedent for the analysis of contemporary algorithmic warfare is 
available in critical scholarship on nuclear weapons systems from the 1980s. Within the 
 6 
field of STS, Donald Mackenzie’s ground breaking book Inventing Accuracy (1990) 
offers a meticulous reverse engineering of the technosciences of inertial guidance 
integral to the US strategic nuclear missile program. In the case of long-range missiles, 
Mackenzie’s aim is effectively to ‘uninvent’ accuracy as an indisputable fact by 
showing the rhetorical and material practices of its demonstration, and in that way to 
interrupt the assertions of precision and certainty so central to weapon systems 
development. He proceeds by showing the heterogeneous engineering of strategic 
doctrine, organisational relations, and infrastructures that together comprise the 
conditions of plausibility for nuclear deterrence.iii Emphasizing the targeting of 
identified military installations, accuracy in the context of the strategic nuclear program 
focused on assuring that a missile fired from thousands of miles away would find its 
designated mark. Mackenzie’s analytic strategy is to document the ineradicable 
uncertainties and artifice involved in the construction of evidence for missile accuracy 
through testing. Related arguments were mobilised in relation to the subsequent 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), including the impossibility of testing under realistic 
conditions, and the difference between assurances that a technological system will act 
according to its specifications on one hand (‘verification’ in the case of 
computationally-based systems), and the validity of those specifications in relation to 
the world in which the system will actually operate on the other (Parnas 1985; Smith 
1993). In the case of SDI plans for ‘launch on warning,’ the problem of threat 
recognition, particularly in the case of increasingly automated systems, became key.iv  
Mackenzie’s analysis provides an inspirational point of reference for questioning 
the recent reinvention of claims for accuracy in the case of UAS operations. Feminist 
security studies scholar Lauren Wilcox attends to the embodied production of 
‘targetable, killable bodies’ in UAS, with particular attention to problematic translations 
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of signals into data, and mapping of data to persons. Considering the killing of 23 
unarmed Afghan citizens in the Uruzgan district by US forces in 2010,v Wilcox 
observes that ‘greater accuracy of vision is unlikely to serve as a check on the mistakes 
of either algorithmic or visual analysis when the bodies are already perceived, or rather, 
felt to be dangerous’ (2017, 20). Wilcox cautions against a mystification of the powers 
of algorithmically-informed war fighting, in favour of a close analysis of the racialised 
and gendered bodies that the drone apparatus articulates. In a related argument, Amoore 
has observed that ‘[t]he decisions taken on the back of algorithmic calculations ... 
conceal political difficulty, even discrimination and violence, within an apparently 
neutral and glossy techno-science’ (2009, 54). My analysis aims to build upon these 
arguments by looking more closely at investments (in all sense of that term) in what is 
at this point a largely speculative field of technological development, singularised under 
the sign of ‘AI’. Before turning to those developments, however, I examine more 
closely the problem for which expanding technologies of data analytics are offered as a 
solution. 
 
Situational awareness and the fog of war 
Kindervater (2017, 33) proposes that there is an epistemological violence common to 
both surveillance and targeting, such that the move towards increasing automation of 
weapon systems, particularly the dream of ‘overcoming human error as a path to truth 
and certainty,’ is part of a wider desire for the instrumentalisation of knowledge in the 
service of control. Within contemporary military discourse, the instrumentalisation of 
knowledge in the service of control over the combat zone is named ‘situational 
awareness,’ a concept that tethers a lineage of rationalist thought to the aspirational 
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future of algorithmic warfare. Situational awareness is conceptualised as a mode of 
human cognition involving accurate perception of a surrounding environment. That 
environment includes the potential presence of ‘the enemy,’ posited as a pre-existing 
population focused on violent action towards those constituted by the military as 
‘friends’.vi The task for the soldier under this doctrine is to perceive the presence of the 
enemy, anticipate the threat that they pose, and respond. This focus on an imagined 
individual engaged in perception of their surrounding environment (whether from a 
position of command and control, or immersed in the ‘front lines’ of combat) is now 
supplemented by a discourse of the network, which erases the subjectivities of its 
constituent persons. Far from displacing the cognitivist and behavioural models that 
inform the psychology of the individual warfighter, however, that model is extended to 
strategic figurations of the network itself. 
The problem for which situational awareness is the posited solution was 
described in the early 19th century by Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, 
and subsequently named the ‘fog of war’ (1989/1832). That phrase gained wider 
popular recognition as the title of director Errol Morris’ documentary about the life and 
times of former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (Morris 2003). In the film 
McNamara reflects on the chaos of US operations in Vietnam. Those operations made 
clear that the reliance on a uniformed body that signals the difference between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ marks the limits of the logics of modern warfighting, as well as of efforts to limit 
war’s injuries. Fundamental to both military strategy and to the laws of armed conflict, 
the principle of distinction between combatants and those who are ‘out of combat’ 
presupposes the war fighter’s ability to recognise the difference, and to act upon that 
recognition.vii This conceptualisation binds contemporary approaches to ‘enhancing’ 
situational awareness through new technologies to military doctrine based in an ideal of 
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a legible battlespace, and a fighting force subject to rational decision-making and 
operational control. 
The most frequently cited authority on situational awareness is M.R. Endsley, 
former Chief Scientist of the US Air Force, who in the 1990s developed a model of 
situational awareness as the perception/decision/action loop first conceived in the 
cybernetic configuration of anti-aircraft weaponry and now reconfigured as complex, 
distributed systems. On Endsley’s definition; ‘Situational awareness … is the perception 
of environmental elements and events with respect to time or space, the comprehension 
of their meaning, and the projection of their future status’ (1995, 36). In an article titled 
‘Enhancing Situational Understanding through the Employment of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles,’ Major Brad Dostal further expands this cosmic view (Kaplan 2006). 
Situational understanding, he writes is:  
The ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of relevant 
information and the tactical situation including friendly and threat situations 
… The RSTA [Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition] 
elements must provide situational understanding of the operational 
environment in all of its dimensions – political, cultural, economic, 
demographic, as well as military factors (2001, 1).viii 
At the same time that this formulation expands the frame of situational awareness, it 
also makes explicit the latter’s role in the process of ‘target acquisition,’ more 
specifically within the apparatus of the UAS.  
The apparatuses of recognition envisioned by military doctrine presuppose an 
independently existing ‘situation’ that can be comprehensively rendered as information. 
To challenge this ontology and the doctrine that it underwrites, I draw on the work of 
feminist STS scholar Karen Barad (2007), for whom ‘the apparatus’ takes on a more 
profoundly performative role in world making. Thinking through experiments in 
quantum physics, Barad’s conception of the apparatus designates the arrangements 
through which entities become onto-epistemologically discernable. Specific apparatuses 
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make possible specific, always contingent, ‘agential cuts,’ which enact what Barad 
articulates as the ‘exteriority-within-phenomena,’ the boundaries that delineate entities 
as separate and identifiably different (2007: 140). Importantly for the concerns of this 
paper, Barad’s conception of the apparatus places the observer inextricably within, 
rather than outside of or separate from, the material-discursive practices of world-
making that the apparatus enables. Read through this reconceptualisation, the principle 
of distinction enacted in weapon systems developed and deployed by the 
hyperdeveloped countries can be understood as incorporating military actors into ever 
more complex and convoluted apparatuses of recognition; sociotechnologies that are 
themselves implicated in generating the unfolding realities that they are posited to 
apprehend. 
In ‘Lethal Visions,’ Bousquet proposes that ‘under the conditions of modern 
warfare it is less the weapon that has come to serve as a prosthetic extension of the eye 
than perception itself which has been caught up in an unrelenting process of becoming 
weapon’ (2017, 63).ix In a series of writings that elaborate this premise, Gregory (2011, 
2014, 2015, 2018) offers a highly detailed, critical reading of the networks that entangle 
air and ground forces in the operations of the US and its allies.x Examining the 2010 
strike in the Uruzgan district of Afghanistan Gregory shows how a highly distributed, 
fragile and noisy network committed to the project of ‘positive identification’ of a threat 
to ‘friendly’ troops on the ground tragically misrecognized its target. Gregory writes: 
Advocates have made much of the extraordinary ability of the full motion 
video feeds from Predators and Reapers to provide persistent surveillance 
(‘the all-seeing eye’), so that they become vectors of the phantasmatic desire 
to produce a fully transparent battlespace. Critics – myself included – have 
insisted that vision is more than a biological-instrumental capacity … Seen 
thus, these feeds interpellate their distant viewers to create an intimacy with 
ground troops while ensuring that the actions of others within the field of 
view remain obdurately Other (2014, 1). 
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Hussain (2013, 31) expands this analysis to include sound as well, pointing out that the 
audio tracks of the drone silence life on the ground while the operators are immersed in 
noisy feeds from analysts and observers located in other parts of the UAS apparatus.xi  
In his extraordinary ethnographic account of the banalities of target generation 
in service of Navy ‘Special Operations Forces’ in Iraq’s Anbar province, Lindsay 
(2017) further illuminates the self-referential circuits of counterinsurgency intelligence. 
Rather than ensure accurate identification, Lindsay argues, targeting processes by the 
Special Operations Task Force of which he was a part reinforced a parochial worldview 
and served the bias of US special forces for ‘direct action,’ effectively fullfilling the 
mandate to produce targets to the detriment of an informed engagement with relevant 
actors on the ground. These investigations make clear that the conditions of 
transparency and rational control imagined in military doctrine are belied by the 
apparatuses of recognition through which militarism reproduces itself. 
 
Machine ‘recognition’ 
If situational awareness posits a pre-existing reality that is temporarily obscured and 
sees the disclosing power of information as a remedy, it is no surprise that in the current 
moment the longstanding military desire for a solution to the ‘fog of war’ is invested in 
expanded networking and data analytics. Figured increasingly under the mystifying 
trope of a singularized and unexplicated ‘AI,’ these technologies are promoted as 
increasing the accuracy of the process of overlaying schemes of categorization to life on 
the ground. Comprising primarily communications metadata,xii ‘signals intelligence’ 
increasingly takes the place of human intelligence for the targeting of aerial strikes, in 
areas of US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the areas of undeclared war 
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fighting in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan (Scahill and Greenwald 2014). The ability to 
accumulate massive amounts of data is accompanied, however, by the debilitating 
challenge of rendering data into ‘actionable’ information. In the context of 
entrepreneurial capital, this problem is translated into an opportunity for businesses that 
promise to develop templates through which the work of finding patterns in data 
renderings can be automated.  
Inspired by the use of predictive data analytics in the context of finance, 
marketing and consumer behaviour, a growing number of companies now offer 
technologies for ‘pattern of life’ analysis in counterterrorism operations (Bell 2013). In 
an article in The Intelligencerxiii titled ‘Activity Based Intelligence: Understanding the 
Unknown,’ Letitia A. Long, then Director of the US National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, sets out the logics of ABI and argues for its virtues (Long 2013). Enabled by 
‘the shift from traditional reconnaissance to the persistent surveillance that the demands 
of irregular warfare have driven since the September 11, 2001 attack,’ and in the 
context of the ‘global war against terrorism’ (8), Long explains: 
Intelligence gathering is like looking in a global ocean for an object that 
might or might not be a fish. It might be anything and it might be important, 
but at first, we are not sure it even exists. And whatever it might be is 
constantly moving and interacting with a huge number of other objects. 
They might make up an organized school of fish or they might not be 
related at all. But we do know that we need to find it, identify what it is, and 
figure out how it relates to all the other objects—whether fish or sea fowl—
we either know or think might be important (8). 
Imagined as a kind of naturalist project, Long’s oceanic metaphor posits the existence 
of an environment inhabited by ‘objects,’ the identities and relevance of which for the 
observer are, however obscured, self-evident once discovered. At the same time, she 
observes: 
The flood of full-motion video (FMV) data streams from unmanned 
airborne vehicles (UAV), the explosion in open source data from social 
media on the Internet, and the huge increase in requirements from special 
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operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq drove the massive expansion in 
the amount of data that can provide actionable intelligence (8).  
Faced with potential threats whose ‘signatures are weak,’ in part due to the very volume 
and noise of the expanding surveillance infrastructure introduced to detect them, 
analysis of data, Long admits, could be ‘overwhelming.’ This hint of the possibility that 
those infrastructural investments might amount to an intelligence apparatus that is 
unusable is forestalled, however, by the invocation of ABI. The strategy of ABI is to 
‘maximize the value of “Big Data”,’ to enable recognition of adversarial patterns of life 
and social networks (Long 2013, 7). Long quotes Edwin Tse, Chief Technologist, 
Ground Systems Business Unit, Northrop Grumman Information Systems, who in a 
PowerPoint Presentation on ABI writes:  
In environments where there is no visual difference between friend and 
enemy, it is by their actions that enemies are visible. Motion is the first 
indication of activity. Temporal and visual patterns of change provides (sic) 
the context for intent (cited in Long 2013, 7). 
The convenience of this proposition for technologies of data analytics should be 
obvious. Building upon a discourse of situational awareness as attunement to anomalous 
shifts in what comprises a ‘normal’ scenery of places, persons, and activities, in this 
apparatus of recognition activity is translated into movement, and movement into 
machine readable changes across the frames of full motion video. Defining activity as 
normative patterns of movement over time translates life worlds inaccessible to 
observation from above to phenomena nicely tuned to the capacities of algorithmically 
structured processes of ‘pattern recognition.’ Long concludes with the assertion that 
‘ABI, while not an analytic panacea, can contribute to decisive planning and successful 
operations in any mission where the customer faces critical questions that discovering 
that which is concealed or unknown can answer’ (10).xiv 
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Long’s claims for the revelatory powers of activity-based analysis are 
challenged, however, by mounting evidence for its in/discriminate effects. An analysis 
of so-called ‘precision’ air strikes carried out by the US and Coalition military in 
Pakistan from 2004 through 2015 by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism documents 
3,341 fatalities from every known UAS attack during that period.xv Of those, 190 or 
5.7% of victims were positively identified as ‘children,’ and 534 or 16% were identified 
as ‘civilians’.xvi Along with these deaths granted the status of ‘collateral damage’ are the 
52 people, or 1.6% of those killed, who were positively identified as so-called high 
profile or high value targets. And finally we are left with the remainder, the 2,565 
people, or 76.7% of those killed, categorized simply as ‘other’. This calls into question 
statements like that offered by Obama’s Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan:  
With the unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely 
target a military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could 
argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows us to distinguish 
more effectively between an al-Qa’ida terrorist and innocent civilians (2012, 
1)   
As the timeline from 2015 continues, the problem intensifies. The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism reports that US ‘counter terror’ airstrikes have doubled since 
Trump’s inauguration, targeting particularly Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan. In 
March of 2017 parts of both Somalia and Yemen were declared areas of ‘active 
hostilities,’ exempting them from targeting rules brought in by Obama to prevent 
civilian casualties. At the same time, the level of secrecy around these extrajudicial 
assassinations has increased. This evidence suggests that the automation of data analysis 
under the sign of artificial intelligence can only serve to exacerbate military operations 
that are at once discriminatory, in their reliance on profiling and other techniques of 
prejudicial classification, and indiscriminate, in their failures to adhere to International 
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Humanitarian Law or any other forms of political or legal accountability. 
 
Project Maven 
In the summer of 2018 the problems of UAS visualities came under new public scrutiny 
thanks to a small but significant rebellion on the part of Google employees against the 
company’s participation in Project Maven. Routed through a Northern Virginia 
technology staffing company called ECS Federal, Google’s participation in the project 
remained quiet until debate on an internal company mailing list was reported in the 
media in March of 2018 (Conger and Cameron 2018, Fang 2018). As the wider Google 
community and the public learned, beginning in late 2017 Google’s Project Maven 
contract was aimed at automating the labeling of video images captured on drone 
cameras for evidence of ‘objects’ of interest, as input to Air Force targeting operations. 
Despite protests on the part of Google spokespeople that the seeing to be automated by 
the project concerns classes of objects and ‘non-offensive uses only’ (Bergen 2018), it 
soon became clear that the objects of interest include vehicles, buildings and indeed 
humans on the ground.  
Framed as a technical problem of image analysis, little detail is publicly 
available on just what the Project Maven apparatus aims to recognize.xvii Academic 
researchers who joined in support of the insurgent Googlers in May of 2018 pointed out 
that further automation of the scopic regimes of the US drone program can only serve to 
worsen an operation that is already highly problematic, even arguably illegal and 
immoral under the laws and norms of armed conflict (Suchman et al 2018). On June 1 
of 2018, Google announced that it would not renew the contract when it ended in March 
of 2019. And on June 7, 2018, Google Cloud CEO Diane Green announced the release 
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of a set of AI Principles, which included the statement that the company would not 
provide AI technologies for use in weapon systems (Google nd).xviii 
The resistance in the tech community was summarized plainly by former Chair 
of Google’s parent company Alphabet and current Chair of the Defense Innovation 
Board Eric Schmidt, in a keynote address at the Center for a New American Security’s 
Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Summit in November of 2017.xix Schmidt 
cites resistance to Project Maven as ‘a general concern ... of somehow the military-
industrial complex using their stuff to kill people incorrectly’ (Scharre et al 2017). 
‘Killing people correctly’ under the laws of war requires adherence to the Principle of 
Distinction and the identification of an imminent threat, and as noted above, the legality 
of current US military operations in this regard is highly contested. Schmidt himself 
explains the problem of machine learning when applied to the ‘abnormal’: 
But the other thing that’s worth saying is that these algorithms, at least 
today, require a great deal of training data. And when I say a great deal I 
mean like, millions of entries in the matrices, billions of pieces of data. So 
the classic example: people would say “well why can’t you figure out 
terrorism?” Well the good news is terrorism is very rare. Right? So it’s 
much, much harder, if you will, to apply AI to that problem. Whereas trying 
to understand traffic, right? As an example of something that occurs every 
day, is far, far easier because you have so much training data (Scharre et al, 
2017). 
These reservations notwithstanding, Schmidt cites Project Maven approvingly, as a 
project that ‘combines a lot of these very clever systems under a General named 
Shanahan, it’s very clever’ (Scharre et al 2017).xx And while the exact nature of the 
targets of analysis under development in the project remains unclear, at least the 
imaginary of an apparatus for the recognition of a terrorist threat continues to circulate. 
As one indicative example, Fortune magazine, in an article titled ‘3 Ways AI is Making 
You Safer,’ reports that ‘Project Maven, the Pentagon’s most high-profile AI initiative, 
aims to use machine-learning algorithms to identify terrorist targets from drone footage’ 
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(Fortune Staff 2019). The Project Maven contract has since been assigned to Anduril 
Industries, whose CEO Palmer Luckey comments that ‘practically speaking, in the 
future, I think soldiers are going to be superheroes who have the power of perfect 
omniscience over their area of operations, where they know where every enemy is, 
every friend is, every asset is’ (Fang 2019), as well as data analytics firm Palantir, best 
known for its role in the Cambridge Analytica scandal (Greene 2019; Confessore and 
Rosenberg 2018). 
Promoters of Project Maven summarize its aims as the use of artificial 
intelligence capabilities to render the analysis of drone surveillance footage more 
efficient and more accurate, but as argued above Maven is an apparatus of recognition 
in a field of increasingly troubled identification. Defense One observes that before the 
system was deployed, the algorithms were ‘trained’ on thousands of hours of archived 
battlefield video captured by drones in the Middle East, yet differences in the trial area, 
explained Lt. Gen. Shanahan, Director of the project, posed problems that required 
further iterations. Moreover, Shanahan admits, ‘There’s some hard work behind the 
scenes that has to be done to first of all get that [video] cleaned up’ in order to find ‘the 
juicy parts where there’s activity and then labeling the data’ (Weisgerber 2017). 
Nonetheless, Shanahan insists, combining the designation of objects by drawing a box 
around them with georegistration of the object’s coordinates ‘is really increasing 
situational awareness’ (Weisgerber 2017). 
The discourse surrounding Project Maven overwhelmingly begs the question of 
the criteria by which ‘objects’ are identified as imminent threats. Just what constitutes 
the profile of an ‘ISIS pickup truck’ (Peniston 2017), and what were the 38 categories 
used by those who hand-labeled 150,000 images to form the initial training data set 
(Allen 2017)?  Most pressingly, what does it mean to be living under drones, where the 
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presence of what is seen by the US apparatus as ‘abnormal activity’ (Weisgerber 2017) 
might at any point trigger the identification of a threat and attack from weapons 
operating outside the range of one’s own perception (Cavallaro et al 2012)? The project 
demands that we turn our attention to the highly problematic systems of classification 
by which categories like ‘Islamic State militants’ operating in Iraq, Syria, Somalia and 
other areas of US strategic interest are constituted. Even more urgently, it calls on us to 
question the premise that those categories are pre-existing and stable and that their 
members exist independently of the classificatory schemes that identify them, or of 
classification’s violent consequences (see Bowker and Star 1999).     
At some point down the road, according to Shanahan, the goal is to put the 
Project Maven technology ‘at the edge,’ on the drones themselves (Weisgerber 2017). 
Analyses of the use of remotely-controlled weapon systems should begin to make clear, 
however, the further problems inherent in the project of untethering these systems from 
their human controllers, which military technophiles take as the next logical step in the 
automation of warfare. Inescapably, the actual situations in which weapons are used are 
fraught with uncertainties. That these give rise to misrecognition on the part of human 
combatants could be – and has been – cited as the rationale for further automation of 
target identification. But if we look carefully at the circumstances surrounding 
documented incidents, it becomes clear that however tragically prone to misreading 
actual situations of contemporary ‘irregular warfare’ might be, the premise that they 





Interrogating the Cold War logics of nuclear deterrence, Mackenzie (1990) has 
effectively opened up for us the black box of weapons targeting, and elucidated the 
contingent accomplishment of accuracy as a fact. In the case of strategic nuclear 
missiles, accuracy involved stabilising mathematical calculations of the trajectory that 
would be followed by a missile once released from its silo. The reinvention of accuracy 
in the case of so-called counterterrorism operations has worked to elide the difference 
between the precision with which a weapon, once fired, will strike its target, and the 
acts of identification of legitimate threats that targeting presupposes. 
Insofar as the ‘becoming weapon’ of perception is tied to the identification of an 
Other as threat, this process long predates modern weaponry. A question for us to 
pursue, then, is just what are the particular apparatuses of recognition that comprise 
contemporary military discourses and technologies? How does the current ‘threat’ 
become recognisable, as specifically situated persons, embodied and emplaced? As 
military perceptions become more deeply imbricated with weaponry, it is also clear that 
the elaboration of weaponry is characterized not by a corresponding sophistication in 
military visualities, but rather by ever more reliance on still crude classificatory systems 
of racial/ethnic stereotyping and profiling. The cross hair of the weapon is deeply 
implicated in the objectification of its target. Yet as long as the ‘accuracy’ of the 
weapon is measured by the relation of lethal force to its designated object, the most vital 
question is left outside of the frame. Whether for a guided missile system, or the final 
actions of a suicide bomber, the fundamental question is how a target comes to be 
designated as such in the first instance, and within what regimes of historic injury and 
future accountability. 
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The operational trope of ‘situational awareness’ is a core doctrine for military 
command and control. Taking a commitment to situational awareness seriously opens 
generative lines of critique – critique that needs to be taken seriously as well by those 
committed to military doctrine and operations (see de Goede forthcoming; Austin et al 
2019). My aim in this paper has been to contribute to the wider body of scholarship 
devoted to understanding more deeply how technologies of militarism enroll their 
subjects and create their objects. The circuits that connect the apparatuses that I have 
discussed are the fantasies of recognition and the practices of dehumanisation that have 
shaped the politics of militarism since the advent of modern war fighting. These become 
ever more dangerous in the contemporary moment, as the figure of the ‘imminent 
threat’ is expanded into a horizon of anywhere and of endless war, and in that way 
actions taken in the name of defense by the US and its allies become a truly imminent 
threat to others. The promise of algorithmic warfare is a technological solution to the 
infamous ‘fog of war,’ taking the speed that automation enables as a proxy for the 
validity of the analyses that result. Rather than further accelerate the speed of 
warfighting, we need to challenge proclamations of an inevitable AI arms race and 
redirect investment to innovations in diplomacy and social justice that might truly de-
escalate the current threats – both geopolitical and planetary – to our collective security. 
 
Notes 
                                                
i The literature here is large and growing. On security studies and targeting see for example 
Amoore 2019; Pugliese 2016; Kindervater 2016, 2017; Bousquet 2017; Wilcox 2015, 2017; 
Gregory 2018. Indicative references from STS include Chandler 2019; Gusterson 2016; 
Lindsay 2017; Parks and Kaplan 2017, Suchman et al 2017, and from feminist theory most 
immediately relevant to this discussion Butler 2010.   
ii On the apparatus see also Agamben 2009, and on architectures of enmity see Shapiro 1997; 
Gregory 2004. For a cogent analysis of what they name ‘apparatuses of distinction’ see 
Perugini and Gordan 2017. 
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iii On heterogeneous engineering see Law 1987; for my own mobilisation of that trope in the 
context of civil engineering see Suchman 2000. 
iv A contemporaneous program, the Strategic Computing Initiative, promised to deliver AI-
based systems to the three branches of the US armed services; for a critique see Ornstein et 
al 1983. 
v This incident was subject to a military investigation and documented in detail in an official 
DoD transcript of the radio transmissions and cockpit conversations. The latter were 
obtained by the Los Angeles Times through a Freedom of Information Act request, and have 
been the subject of a series of accounts and analyses. An early source is Cloud 2011; see also 
Chamayou 2014, Allinson 2015, Cockburn 2015, Gregory 2011; 2018, and Suchman 2015. 
vi The friend/enemy difference has been widely and incisively critiqued within security studies 
and related fields; for a partial review of recent work see Suchman et al 2017; see also 
Perugini and Gordon 2017; Wilke 2017; Rogers 2018. 
vii International Humanitarian Law is a body of customary law developed in the aftermath of 
WWII as part of the Geneva Conventions, aimed at establishing rules for humanitarian 
treatment under conditions of war. Rule number 1 of IHL is the Principle of Distinction, 
which states that ‘The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians 
and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be 
directed against civilians’ (ICRC 2004).  
viii It is worth recalling that 2001 is the year of the first use of an armed drone by the US military 
in Afghanistan, a strike that killed a number of people while missing the one person, Taliban 
leader Mullah Omar, who was its target. As I was completing this article The Washington 
Post released The Afghanistan Papers (Whitlock 2019), a trove of government documents 
showing systematic misrepresentation of US operations in Afghanistan over a 18 year 
period. The papers include the statement of Douglas Lute, a three-star Army general who 
served as the White House’s Afghan war czar during the Bush and Obama administrations, 
who told government interviewers in 2015 ‘We were devoid of a fundamental understanding 
of Afghanistan — we didn’t know what we were doing.’ 
ix Though note here that Bousquet et al. also observe approvingly that ‘A productive turn [in IR 
and Security Studies] has recently begun to explore the agential power of weapons in and of 
themselves’ (2017, 4)). Without dismissing the importance of the materiality of weapons, the 
phrase ‘in and of themselves’ would seem in tension with their call for ‘attention to how 
objects, ideologies, practices, bodies and affects get drawn into specific assemblages of 
violent intentionality’ (1). For a nuanced analysis of the political agencies afforded by 
networked digital cameras see Saugmann forth. 
x Gregory (2018) rightly redirects attention from the operators of contemporary apparatuses of 
warfighting to ‘the radical and devastating bioconvergence between the Hellfire missiles 
launched from those platforms and the bodies on the other side of the screens’ (2018: 347). 
His most recent review of the 2010 incident in Uruzgan, Afghanistan emphasises the 
professional vision that produced the strike, but also works to recover a closer grasp for us as 
readers of those who were the strikes’ targets. See also Hussain 2013; Wilcox 2017. 
xi Those ‘living under drones’ (Cavallaro et al, 2012), Hussain observes, are unable to return the 
gaze that surveys them from above and beyond their range of vision, while the constant 
sound of the drone comprises an ongoing, and profoundly traumatising, threat. On sensoria 
of war see McSorley 2014; Näser-Lather 2015. 
xii Metadata refers to information associated with a communication other than its content, e.g. all 
contacts by a targeted phone number, or geo-tracked travel through an area marked as the 
location of a targeted individual or group. 
xiii The journal’s masthead identifies its sponsor as the Association of Former Intelligence 
Officers. 
xiv The reference to the defense agencies as the intelligence community’s ‘customer’ articulates 
the further ellision of military and civilian imaginaries within the contemporary turn to a 
data-centric ‘service economy’. See Amoore 2009. 
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xv For a visualisation of these data see PitchInteractive 2013. For a powerful account of the 
‘uncounted’ victims of Coalition forces air strikes in Iraq see Khan and Gopal 2017. 
xvi On the problematic categories of ‘children’ and ‘civilians’ see Kinsella 2011; Wilke 2017. 
xvii On the agency of Disclosing only that the trial system focuses on 38 classes of objects 
(Pellerin 2017), The Defense Department claims that all 5,000 documents related to 
Google’s work on Project Maven are exempt from Freedom of Information Act law, as they 
possess ‘critical infrastructure security information’ (Biddle 2019). 
xviii For a critical reading of the Principles see Suchman 2018. 
xix Schmidt retained the positions of Member of the Board and Technical Advisor to Alphabet at 
the same time that he took up his position as Chair of the Defense Innovation Board, 
characterized as an ‘external’ advisor to the DoD reporting to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. Schmidt is currently also Chair of the National Security Commission on AI, funded 
through the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2019. 
xx The reference here is to Air Force Lt. Gen. John N.T. ‘Jack’ Shanahan, Director of the 
project. It is worth noting that at the time that this address was given Schmidt presumably 
was aware of Google’s contract on Project Maven, but there is no mention of that association 
in his comments. 
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